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Abstract
Eliminating unnecessary exposure is a principle of server security. The huge IPv6
address space enhances security by making scanning infeasible, however, with recent
advances of IPv6 scanning technologies, network scanning is again threatening server
security. In this paper, we propose a new model named addressless server, which
separates the server into an entrance module and a main service module, and assigns an
IPv6 prefix instead of an IPv6 address to the main service module. The entrance
module generates a legitimate IPv6 address under this prefix by encrypting the client
address, so that the client can access the main server on a destination address that is
different in each connection. In this way, the model provides isolation to the main
server, prevents network scanning, and minimizes exposure. Moreover it provides a
novel framework that supports flexible load balancing, high-availability, and other
desirable features. The model is simple and does not require any modification to the
client or the network. We implement a prototype and experiments show that our model
can prevent the main server from being scanned at a slight performance cost.
Introduction
Exhaustion of IPv4 addresses has long been recognized and is now a reality. IPv6 [1]
was proposed in 1995 to solve this problem. The main improvement is the 128-bit
address over the 32-bit IPv4 address, together with other goals like end-to-end feature
and better security. As of March 2020, about 25% information resources ( websites,
emails, etc.), 60% DNS servers, and 30% Internet clients support IPv6 1. With the rise
of the Internet of Things, 5G, and cloud computing, it is predicted that more than 75
billion devices will be connected to the Internet by 2025 2, while there are only 4 billion
IPv4 addresses in total. An inevitable and faster adoption of IPv6 can be expected. IT
giants such as Facebook3 and Microsoft4 have been moving to an IPv6-only internal
network. An IAB (Internet Architecture Board) statement expected that the IETF
would stop requiring IPv4 compatibility in new or extended protocols, and future work
would optimize for and depend on IPv6 5. Pure IPv6 is the future of the Internet.
1https://www.vyncke.org/ipv6status/
2https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iot-number-of-connected-devices-worldwide
3https://www.facebook.com/ipv6/
4https://teamarin.net/2019/04/03/microsoft-works-toward-ipv6-only-single-stack-network/
5https://www.iab.org/2016/11/07/iab-statement-on-ipv6/
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IPv6 is developed with security in mind, realizing that security as well as privacy has
always been one of the biggest threats to the Internet. It is natural to start with
utilizing the massive address space of IPv6 to enhance security and privacy, considering
that this is its biggest difference from IPv4.
By making network scanning difficult, this massive address space of IPv6 has
naturally provided preliminary protection. The IP address is the identifier and locator
of the Internet. Thus network scanning is usually the first phase of an attack to obtain
the IP addresses of potential victims. This is easy in IPv4. The scanning time of the
entire IPv4 address space is only about 45 minutes [2]. However, it takes more than 100
quintillion years to scan the entire IPv6 address space with the same efficiency. The
massive address space of IPv6 helps a lot to hide the address of a device.
However, on one hand, NAT in the IPv4 era, albeit not designed for security, brings
the byproduct of hiding devices and topology of the network from the outside. NAT is
stateful and violates the end-to-end principle, thus deprecated by IPv6 designers. Many
network administrators, however, are so used to the invisibility provided by NAT that
they feel that NAT-less IPv6 rather poses a threat of exposure, despite the difficulty of
scanning IPv6’s huge address space.
On the other hand, recent advances of IPv6 scanning technology have threatened the
preliminary invisibility provided by the huge address space. Various approaches have
been proposed to scan the IPv6 Internet more efficiently mainly in two ways: collecting
active IPv6 address records [3–10], and using statistical and machine learning methods
to generate hitlists [11–16]. Most of these approaches are server-specific. Scanning IPv6
clients remains difficult, which brings many security benefits for the clients.
We cannot help but think, can we further utilize the IPv6 address space to make
IPv6 servers unscannable as well, avoiding as much unnecessary exposure as possible,
thereby allowing servers to enjoy the security advantages brought by invisibility, but not
violating end-to-end reachability?
There have been attempts to enhance the anti-scanning feature of the IP addresses,
mainly by: 1) generating addresses that is semantically opaque and more random [17],
2) using temporal [18,19] or hopping [20–25] addresses with short lifetime, and further
3) using a unique address for each connection [26–30] or even packet [31,32].
The former two approaches are basically incremental improvements. Each device
still has one IP at a time which can be scanned. The per-connection address is an
interesting idea but previous models are very complex, unscalable, and hard to deploy.
Specifically, they largely remain within the framework of dynamically shared address
pools. Address mapping and address collision become problematic, the network needs to
be modified to enable routing, and the system is complicated. Moreover, few works are
about servers, and generally require synchronous cooperation of the client-side.
On the other hand, the current network security model relies on encryption. For
instance, SEND [33], TLS [34], and DNSSEC [35] are used at the data link layer, the
transport layer, and the application layer, respectively. At the network layer, IPsec [36]
encrypts the payload of IP packets but the (outer) IP addresses are left exposed. Since
TCP/IP was introduced, the creators of the Internet have considered introducing
encryption into the IP address itself. This is an extravagant dream in the era of IPv4
since addresses are scarce and reused with great care. However, this is changed in IPv6,
and the 128-bit address provides sufficient space to carry the encrypted information.
Previous work [30–32] propose to encrypt host identity into pseudo-random temporal
addresses, so that the host identity is hidden from the outside network. But it has to be
done on local routers, otherwise routing will fail. The network needs to be modified and
it is sort of encapsulation. CGA [37] applies hashing in auto-generation of addresses,
but it aims to solve link-local address spoofing and again the addresses are exposed.
The literature has not seen a simple and scalable mechanism to introduce encryption
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into the IP address itself.
In this paper, a model named addressless public server is proposed. We creatively
use the prefix delegation mechanism [38] in a way that is different from its original
intention. So that we introduce encryption into the per-connection address in a very
simple way and no modification of other participants is needed. And we make it usable
for public servers to make them difficult to be scanned. Not only is security
strengthened in this way, but our model also offers a novel architecture to enable
flexible high-availability and other features.
The addressless sever has two modules, one module provides independent entrance of
the server, the other provides the main services. When receiving access requests, the
entrance module generates a destination address using encryption, and redirects the
request to the generated destination address. This destination address is different for
each connection request. The main service module is allocated a prefix instead of an
IPv6 address and listens on all the addresses under the prefix. When the main service
module receives a data flow, it conducts verification on the destination address, and
only responds to flows that pass the verification. Scanning traffic and attackers that
visit the main service module directly cannot pass the verification, therefore will be
immediately dropped. In this way, we make the main server imperceptible.
This model separates the network entrance and provides isolation for the main
server. It allocates a prefix instead of an address to the main server, so that it no longer
has one address at a time, thus imperceptible by the outside network. At the same time,
our model naturally supports flexible high-availability solutions such as lightweight load
balancing, active-active cluster, and CDN. More security and functional mechanisms
can be developed based on it. All in all, our model provides a novel perspective on
various problems faced by public servers.
Background and Related Work
Our model uses the massive IPv6 address space to prevent the server from being
scanned. So in this section, we first introduce network scanning and IPv6 address space
security. Then we introduce prefix delegation, the address configuration mechanism that
our model built upon. Finally, we make a detailed analysis of previous work in using
IPv6 address space to enhance security, and compare our model to the most related
ones.
Network Scanning
Network scanning is a technology to collect the active addresses by sending packets to a
huge set of addresses. Early scanning techniques like Nmap [39] often take days to scan
the entire IPv4 address space. Zmap [2] proposed in 2013 reduces the scanning time of
the entire IPv4 address space to about 45 minutes. This makes the cost of scanning
under IPv4 negligible.
Due to the massive address space, network scanning in IPv6 has always been
considered impossible. Although Zmapv6 [40] is proposed to scan IPv6 addresses, it is
only a scanning tool that uses the same technique as Zmap without improving scanning
efficiency. However, a series of techniques has been proposed in recent years to reduce
the difficulty of IPv6 scanning.
The work on IPv6 scanning can be divided into two types. One is to generate hitlists
by collecting active addresses on the Internet. Various sources can be used to collect
active addresses. Fiebig et al. [3] propose to generate the hitlist using DNS data, and
Borgolte et al. [4] propose to generate the hitlist using DNSSEC-signed reverse zones,
while rDNS data is used by Fiebig et al. [5]. These researches mainly focus on
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generating the hitlists of Internet servers, while Beverly et al. [6] and Rohrer et al. [7]
introduce approaches to collect router addresses, and Rye et al. [8] probe and collect
addresses of last-hop routers using traceroutes. Gasser et al. [9] summarize these
methods and give a large hitlist set, and publish a compiled, open-source, and
frequently updated hitlist whose quality is enhanced using active measurements [10].
The other is to generate hitlists by predicting active addresses using statistical or
machine learning algorithms. Foremski et al. [11] first propose that active IPv6
addresses can be predicted by statistical algorithms. They introduce Entropy/IP, an
algorithm to generate hitlists using the Bayesian algorithm. Ullrich et al. [12] introduce
a scanning algorithm based on pattern recognition, and Zuo et al. [13] analyze the active
addresses and make predictions through association rule learning. Murdock et al. [14]
propose 6Gen, an algorithm that uses some active addresses as seeds to generate hitlists.
Liu et al. [15] introduce 6Tree, which uses hierarchical clustering to predict addresses
and generate hitlists. Deep learning methods have also been introduced. Cui et al. [16]
stack gated convolutional network to encode address structure and generate hitlists.
IPv6 Address Space Security
Since the birth of IPv6, researchers have been looking for ways to increase the security
and privacy of IPv6 addresses.
In RFC 4291 [41], an IPv6 address is divided into two parts: a 64-bit prefix and a
64-bit identifier interface (IID). The most widely used IPv6 address configuration
methods are SLAAC [42] and DHCPv6 [38]. In SLAAC, the IID is generated from the
MAC address of the device using the EUI-64 algorithm [43]. This makes the IID part of
the IPv6 address remaining constant in the lifetime of a device. In DHCPv6, the rules
of address configuration are determined by the network administrator. In the early days,
these rules are simple and regular, which make the addresses used in the network
showing obvious patterns. Scanning is quite easy for both SLAAC and DHCPv6
addresses, thus posing a threat to security.
To solve this problem, SLAAC Privacy Extension (SLAAC PE) is proposed in RFC
4941 [18]. In RFC 4941, the client is recommended to use a temporary address to
communicate with servers. The IID of the temporary address is one-time, generated by
applying the MD5 algorithm [44] to the previous IID. In this way, the security and
privacy of the client are enhanced in SLAAC. DHCPv6 also proposes an approach of
allocating temporary addresses [45], but it is not widely used because it brings a series
of problems [46].
More in-depth work is introduced on this basis. Semantically opaque IID is
recommended to be used in SLAAC and DHCPv6 by RFC 7217 [17], RFC 7493 [47],
and RFC 8065 [48], etc. RFC 7707 [19] recommends to reduce the lifetime and increase
the randomness of IPv6 addresses used by network devices based on a summary of
scanning algorithms.
At the same time, researchers also put forward some work on the measurement of
active IPv6 address space. Plonka et al. [49] analyze the temporal and spatial
characteristics of active IPv6 addresses. Li et al. [50] describe the distribution
characteristics of Internet IPv6 prefixes. These works demonstrate how the IPv6
addresses are actually used thus objectively shows the security status of the IPv6
address space.
There are also a few works focused on the detection and defense of IPv6 scanning.
Fukuda et al. [51] introduce an approach to detect IPv6 scanning and evaluate relevant
severity. Plonka et al. [52] introduce kIP, a new approach to increase the anonymity of
IPv6 addresses.
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IPv6 Prefix Delegation
In our model, the main service module is assigned an IPv6 prefix. Assigning a prefix to
a device is allowed in IPv6, typically using the DHCP-PD [38] mechanism. DHCP-PD is
originally proposed to allow a DHCP server to assign a prefix to a DHCP client, so that
this DHCP client can further allocate the addresses under the prefix to other devices. In
our model DHCP-PD is used for a different purpose. The main service module is
assigned a prefix using DHCP-PD, but after that, it uses the addresses under the prefix
itself, instead of allocating them to others.
Besides DHCP-PD, prefix delegation is also used in other scenarios. RFC 8273 [53]
allows each device in the same subnet to be configured with a unique IPv6 prefix, so
that they are logically under different subnets and cannot send packets to each other
except through the first-hop router. Using this, isolation is provided between the
devices in a shared-access network. However, each device only uses one fixed address
under the prefix. To the best of our knowledge, the literature has not made deeper use
of the prefix allocated to a device.
Using IPv6 Address Space to Enhance Security and Privacy
IP address hopping. The technique to dynamically and frequently change the IP
address of a device has long been used to prevent attackers from finding the target since
the era of IPv4. In the IPv4 era, it can only be achieved with the help of the network
service, such as DHCP servers [54] and SDN [24,25]. In the IPv6 era, the massive
address space and SLAAC enable auto-configuration of dynamic addresses [21]. IP
address hopping of a server is harder, since its address needs to be known by clients to
allow inbound traffic. In previous work, the sender has to update the addresses
synchronously with the receiver based on a shared secret [20,22,23].
Per-connection address and beyond. IPv6 addressing model specifically
supports assigning multiple IP addresses to a single interface [41]. Thus researchers
have gone beyond address hopping to assign each connection (or a set of closely related
connections) a unique address [26–30] to enhance privacy. Our model also uses
per-connection addresses, and a detailed comparison is given later in this subsection.
The per-connection address is not the end of the road either. Researchers extend
this idea temporally to propose per-packet address [31,32], and spatially to propose
prefix alteration [55–57]. The per-packet address means to use a unique address for each
packet. However, the stronger privacy is achieved at the cost of higher complexity of
demultiplexing packets to flows and modification of local networks to enable
routing [31,32]. Prefix alteration means not only the IID part but also the prefix part of
a device’s address can be varying. It can be achieved by prefix hopping, prefix bouquets,
prefix sharing, and variable-length prefix [55,56], or by exploiting mobile IPv6 [57].
Limitation of previous work. The idea of using address space to hide node
identity stems from IP address hopping in the IPv4 era, which can only be achieved
through a pool of dynamic addresses shared by a group of devices due to scarcity of
addresses. Although previous works have applied the idea to IPv6 and extended it to
per-connection or even per-packet address, in essence, they have not gone beyond
dynamically shared addresses pool. That is, devices are still sharing a set of dynamic
addresses, although this set becomes enormous; it contains all the addresses under the
IPv6 prefix.
The scheme of dynamically shared addresses pool brings two problems. First,
mapping an address to a device or a connection and the related routing are difficult.
Early work is stateful, the mapping needs to be recorded [26,28,29]. More recent work
achieve stateless mapping by encrypting the host identity into the one-time
pseudo-random address. However, decryption needs to be done at the local router
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because the host identity needs to be extracted for local routing [30–32]. Modification
of the network service makes it unlikely to be deployed.
Second, IPv6 enables self-generated pseudo-random addresses without relying on
stateful DHCP servers. But making sharing of addresses stateless brings the possibility
of address collisions. Previous works skip this problem by stating that the possibility is
negligible or use duplicate address detection to detect and avoid collisions [28,29]. Some
use external unique identifiers to generate addresses, such as Electronic Product
Code [58] in IoT scenarios.
Further, few works are about servers. On one hand, it is complex for a server to
maintain a huge set of addresses assigned to each of its connection under this
dynamically shared addresses pool scheme. For instance, Sakurai et al. [29] use sliding
windows to maintain active addresses. On the other hand, the contradiction between
inbound traffic and dynamic addresses has not been solved. Sender and receiver need to
cooperate and synchronously update a pseudo-random sequence of addresses calculated
based on a secret [20,22,23,29]. This is infeasible for public servers.
Comparison of our model. We innovatively utilize the prefix delegation
mechanism [38]. Our model is built on the idea of the per-connection address. However,
the device is assigned all the addresses under the prefix, thus the complexity of routing
and address collision is completely eradicated, and modification of the network service is
no longer necessary. And specifically for a server with a huge amount of connections,
the maintenance of the active addresses is no longer a problem.
Prefix delegation also enables us to introduce encryption into the address at the
endpoint. Previously it has to be done on local routers [30–32] otherwise the
dynamically shared addresses cannot be routed properly. Together with a novel stateless
salting algorithm, we achieve stateless mapping of the per-connection address to the
client.
And to make the public server accessible at the per-connection addresses, we
innovatively separate the Internet entrance module from the main service module, and
use the entrance module to generate the encrypted address and redirect the client. In
this way, no modification of the client-side is needed. The exposed entrance module
bears no other logic and is simple, and the main service is isolated and hidden in the
huge address space.
Design of Addressless Server
In this section, the design of addressless server is presented.
Design Principles
The addressless server model is designed to prevent the server from being perceived and
scanned by the attackers. To reach this goal, the model takes advantages of the
following features:
1. Separate the Internet entrance module from the main service module, and provide
isolation to the main service module.
2. Allocate a prefix instead of an address to the main service module.
3. Eliminate the one-to-one correspondence between the server and the IP address.
4. Introduce encryption into IPv6 Address to make use of the redundant IPv6
address space.
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In this way, the model can provide a triple guarantee for the server: strip the Internet
entrance from the main server, hide the legitimate address in the massive IPv6 address
space, and use encryption to ensure that only the legitimate address generated by the
entrance module can be visited. By decoupling the server and the IP address, attackers
can no longer use the IP address as the identification of the server. This is the meaning
of “addressless”. Through this, the server is protected from being perceived and
scanned by the outside devices, so that security is enhanced.
System Design
We divide the server into two modules, the entrance module and the main service
module. The entrance module has a fixed Internet address; the main service module is
configured with a prefix and uses all the addresses under the prefix to communicate
with clients. The topology of the addressless server is shown in Fig 1.
First Hop Router
Internet
Entrance Module
IPv6 
Client
IPv6 Client
IPv6 Client
Main Service Module
Fig 1. Topology of the Addressless Server. The server is separated into the
entrance module and the main service module. The main service module is directly
connected to the first-hop router. The dotted line indicates that the entrance module
can be deployed anywhere on the Internet.
The main service module is directly connected to the first-hop router. The main
service module and the first-hop router are both configured with a non-public IPv6
address. This address is used for prefix delegation and routing. It is usually a link-local
address. If there are more management requirements, other private addresses such as
ULA [59] can also be configured. The first-hop router routes all the packets whose
destination addresses are under this prefix to the main service module. The entrance
module is configured with a fixed IPv6 address. This address should be configured as an
AAAA record in the DNS system.
When an Internet client initiates a connection with the server, it first sends a DNS
query to the DNS server. The DNS server returns the entrance address to the client.
Then the client sends the request to this address. After receiving the request, the
entrance module uses the prefix of the main service module and the source address of
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the packet to calculate an IPv6 address through an encryption algorithm, then returns
this address to the client. Finally, the client initiates connections with the main service
module using this address as the destination address.
The calculation process can be formulated as the following equations. We denote the
client address as SA, the encryption process as function f() (the specific process of f()
is discussed in next subsection), and the prefix of the main service module as prefix,
then the destination address is:
DA1:N = prefix (1)
DAN+1:128 = f(SA) (2)
To achieve compatibility, clients that are agnostic of our model should be able to
communicate with the public server without modification. So we use the redirection
mechanism to achieve the process of entrance module returning the generated address
and client connecting that address. In this case, the entrance module temporarily
redirects the client’s request to the generated address. After receiving this message, the
client sends a new request to the main service module. When the main service module
receives a flow, it verifies the destination address using the source address through the
same encryption algorithm. The verification process can be described by Eq (3)
Res = g(SA,DAN+1:128)) (3)
In Eq (3), g() is the verification function. Res is a bool value. True means the flow
passes the verification while False means the flow fails the verification. If the
verification fails, the server discards the packets.
The mechanism is described in Fig 2.
 Router
Entrance Module
IPv6 Client
Main Service Module
DNS Server
① Request for AAAA Record
② DNS Server Returns the Address of the Entrance Module
③ User Visits Entrance Module
④Entrance Module Generates an Address and  Return a Redirect Message to the Address
⑤Initiate Communication with the Main Service Module
Internet
Fig 2. Mechanism of the Addressless Server. The communication process of how
a client successfully initiates a flow to the server.
Noted that the client here is just a common IPv6 client. It is configured with an IPv6
address, not a prefix. The address used in the whole connection lifetime should remain
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unchanged. Otherwise, it may cause the source address used in the encryption and the
source address used in the decryption different, leading to the failure of the verification.
The verification process is performed in each flow. The main service module only
needs to perform the verification once for each flow because the source address and
destination address remain unchanged during the flow. Once the connection is
established, the server can directly accept the following packets until the end of the flow.
After a connection is terminated, the client should visit the address of the entrance
module if it is going to initiate another connection, and the entrance module generates
another address and redirects the request to this new address.
To prevent attackers from intercepting data flows and launching replay attacks, the
generated address should be different each time. To reach this goal, we add a
time-varying factor in the encryption process f(), which is described as salt. In this
case, when the attacker intercepts the packets and forges an attack message using the
source and destination address from those packets, it will not be effective because the
legitimate destination address is different because the salt has changed.
In our model, the entrance module can be deployed anywhere on the Internet,
logically and geographically. It can be configured on the same device as the main
service module, and connected to the Internet through the same first-hop router. The
entrance module can also be configured on different devices in the same subnet, or even
a location far from the main server on the Internet. The address allocated to the
entrance module can be one of the addresses under the prefix delegated to the main
service module, or it can be a totally independent global unicast address. Furthermore,
considering that the entrance module only provides simple and reproducible services, it
is easy to stack or distributed deploy the entrance modules. All in all, the configuration
of the entrance module is very flexible. Various strategies can be used on the
deployment of the entrance modules to achieve better results.
In the addressless server mechanism, the entrance module is responsible for
calculating the destination address and returning a redirect message to the client. If the
server needs a stricter strategy, the entrance module can also provide user
authentication service, and only replies to the client who passes the authentication.
This ensures that all the clients that can perceive the main service module are
authenticated, which further ensures server security without affecting the simplicity.
From the above discussion, we can see that our model takes advantage of the
redundant space of the IPv6 address by introducing encryption into IPv6 suffixes. The
IPv6 space is very large, and only a small part is actually used in traditional scenarios.
As a result, we can ‘waste’ the address space to prevent the server from being scanned.
We assign a prefix to the server to free up the suffix space and let it carry the
authentication information. In our model, the use of the prefix and the suffix of the
destination address is different. The prefix is used for routing while the suffix is used for
carrying authentication information to provide additional security benefits.
Encryption Algorithm
The encryption in this paper is essentially a signature-verification process. When a
client initiates communication, the entrance module first signs the source address,
embeds the result into the destination address, and returns it to the client. Then the
client initiates connections to that address, and the main service module conducts
verification using the source address and the destination address. Since we do not need
to restore the message, f() here does not need to be reversible.
The encryption process f() is described as follows:
H SA = Hash(SA) (4)
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P SA = Φ(H SA, salt) (5)
DA65−128 = e(P SA, key) (6)
DA = strcat(prefix,DA65−128) (7)
And the verification process g() is described as follows:
H SA = Hash(SA) (8)
P SA = e−1(DA65−128, key) (9)
Result = Ψ(P SA,H SA, salt) (10)
In Eq (4)-Eq (10), SA is the client address (source address of the connection
request); DA is the generated address under the prefix of the main service module
(destination address of the connection request).
In Eq (4) and Eq (8), Hash() is a hash function to convert the source address into a
64-bit sequence. A hash function guarantees that the sequence is uniformly distributed
in the entire range space. Any hash function is feasible here, including cryptographic
hash functions such as md5 [44] and SHA-128 [60], or string hash functions such as DJB
and BDKR. The string hash function is a better choice here because of the higher
efficiency. DJB algorithm is used in our prototype.
In Eq (5) and Eq (10), salt is used as the time-varying factor. We add the salt in
function Φ(), which is discussed in the next subsection. Function Ψ() is the verification
function determined by Φ().
In Eq (6) and Eq (9), e() is the encryption function, and e−1() is the decryption
function. key is the encryption key.
Fig 3 shows the encryption and verification process briefly.
Fig 3. Encryption Process and Verification Process.
Theoretically, the encryption algorithm e() can be arbitrary, as long as the
ciphertext can be held in the suffix space in some way. However, we should consider it
from two perspectives: security and efficiency. Considering security, a mainstream
encryption algorithm should be used here. There are two categories of encryption
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algorithms: the symmetric encryption algorithm and the asymmetric encryption
algorithm. The symmetric encryption algorithm has the following advantages: to
achieve the same security level, it has shorter ciphertext length and key length. While
the advantage of the asymmetric encryption algorithm is that it allows the public key
not to be secret. In our model, the key is used only by the entrance module and the
main server module, which are both under the control of the service owner. There is no
need to distribute the public key, and it is not a challenge to keep the encryption key
secret, thus there is no need for the asymmetric encryption algorithm. Considering
efficiency, the symmetric encryption algorithm is also better for faster encryption and
decryption processes. As a result, the symmetric encryption algorithm is a better choice
in our model, which can ensure a faster encryption/decryption process and a higher
level of security for a given ciphertext length.
The most widely used symmetric encryption algorithms are DES [61], 3DES [61],
AES [62], etc. Considering the 64-bit length of the IPv6 suffix, to make the encryption
easier, DES or 3DES is better here. Although DES is often considered insecure in the
modern network environment, it can provide a sufficient level of security in our scenario
(discussed in the Security Analysis Section) while it is much faster than 3DES. As a
result, we use DES as e() in our prototype implementation. Nevertheless, our model
does not place restrictions on exactly which encryption algorithm is used; that is up to
the choice of the server owner.
Salting Algorithm
We discuss the generation of the time-varying factor (salt) in this subsection. To make
the generated addresses unpredictable and the replay attacks ineffective, adding salt is
necessary in the address generation.
Stateful salt is the common choice in many salting scenarios. First, we consider if we
can use stateful salt in our model. In this case, the entrance module and the main
service module save the same state sequence. When an address is generated by the
entrance module, it uses the current state as the salt, then hops to the next state. It is
similar in the verification process in the main service module. However, it is not a good
choice here because synchronization is a challenge. As shown in Fig 4, first client A
visits the entrance module and obtains the redirect address Address1 generated with
salt i, later client B obtains the address Address2 generated with salt i+1. But because
of different delay, B visits the main service module earlier. At this time, the state in the
main service module is still the salt i, thus the packets of B will fail verification and get
wrongly dropped. This situation will happen frequently since a public server is generally
visited simultaneously by a high volume of clients all over the world who face very
different network conditions. Synchronization of states between the entrance module
and the main server module thus become very challenging.
To solve this problem, we introduce a novel stateless salting algorithm. In this
algorithm, the entrance module and the main service module do not save any state.
Public information is used instead. System timestamp is a desirable choice among the
various public information because it changes over time naturally and is extremely easy
to obtain. We calculate the salt using the timestamp as equation Eq (11)
Salt = (SystemTime− T0)/X (11)
This equation is similar to the one-time key generation algorithm specified in RFC
6238 [63]. T0 is the initial value and X is the step size. These two parameters are the
same and kept secret in the entrance module and the main service module. Even if the
attacker speculates about the possible timestamps based on the current time, he cannot
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Main Service Module
IPv6 Client A
IPv6 Client B
Entrance Module
18:00:00, Address 1 generated with Salt i
18:00:01, Address 2 generated with Salt i+1
18:00:03
18:00:02
Fig 4. Stateful Salt is NOT a Good Choice. Client B visits the entrance module
later than client A and gets an address generated with salt i+1. Due to different delay,
B visits the main service module earlier than A and fails verification because the main
service module is expecting salt i.
obtain the salt because of the confidentiality of T0 and X, which further enhances the
security of encryption.
The salting process is described by Eq (12)
P SA = XOR(Salt,H SA) (12)
In Eq (12), P SA is described in Eq (5).
XOR() is used as the function to add the salt in Eq (12). Here XOR() can be
replaced by any operations, with the only requirements that: (1) the result should be
different if the salt changes and (2) the operation is reversible. The complexity of
XOR() is extremely low, so it is used as the salting function here. This does not
introduce any additional security risks.
The server’s verification process is described as the following equations:
P SA = e−1(DA65−128)) (13)
Salt = XOR(P SA,H SA) (14)
Ts = Salt ∗X + T0 (15)
Result = (SystemTime− Ts) ∈ (0, threshold)?True : False (16)
In the following, we discuss the value of threshold in Eq (16). The time required in
general occasions and the error redundancy should be considered here. We assume that
the timestamp used for encryption in the entrance module is Ts1 and the system time
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for verification in the main service module is Ts2, then the time difference ∆T can be
described by Eq (17):
∆T = Ttrans en + Ttrans ma + Tpro cl + Tpro en + Tpro ma + Tsyn (17)
In Eq (17):
Ttrans en is the transmission delay of the packet from the entrance module to the
client;
Ttrans ma is the transmission delay from the client to the main service module;
Tpro cl is the processing time of the client between receiving the redirect message and
sending the new request to the main service module;
Tpro en is the processing time of the entrance module from time stamping to sending
the message;
Tpro ma is the processing time of the main service module from receiving the
message to verifying the timestamp.
Tsyn is the system time difference between the main service module and the entrance
module.
It is shown in Fig 5.
Main Service Module
IPv6 Client A
Entrance Module
Timestamp
Verification
Tpro_en
Ttrans_en
Ttrans_ma
Tpro_cl
Tpro_ma
∆T(Tsyn is not included)
Fig 5. Time Elapsed Between Timestamp of Encryption and Verification.
It consists of two transmission delays (entrance module to client, and client to main
service module) and three processing times (entrance module, client, and main service
module). Note the system time difference Tsyn is not included.
In Eq (17), Tpro en and Tpro ma are usually negligibly small. The entrance module
and the main service module are both under the control of the server operator, thus the
system time difference can be minimized and Tsyn should also be negligible. In this case,
Eq (17) is:
∆T = Ttrans en + Ttrans ma + Tpro cl (18)
That is, the threshold should be at least greater than the sum of the delay from the
entrance module to the client, the delay from the client to the main service module, and
September 29, 2020 13/33
the time required by the client to process the redirect message. This usually varies from
several milliseconds to several seconds. Considering redundancy, a threshold of about 10
seconds is generally appropriate. A larger threshold brings higher security risks, while a
smaller threshold means less redundancy.
If the synchronization between the entrance module and the main service module is
hard, which means Tsyn in Eq (17) cannot be neglected, then the verification function
Eq (16) should be modified as Eq (19):
Result = (SystemTime− Ts) ∈ (−threshold1, threshold2)?True : False (19)
Here the −threshold1 is negative, because the system time of the main service
module when it performs verification can be earlier than the system time of the
entrance module when it performs timestamp. Since the difference in system time
synchronization is usually stable, system operators can adjust threshold1 and
threshold2 accordingly.
However, considering that all modules are controlled by the server owner, time
synchronization should not be a challenge. So on most occasions, we can regard Tsyn
negligible.
The salting algorithm is described in Fig 6.
Fig 6. Salting Process.
Prefix Length Consideration
Generally speaking, according to RFC 4291 [41] and related RFCs, an IPv6 address has
a 64-bit prefix and a 64-bit interface identification. Although this is not mandatory, it is
consistent with our algorithm. In the above discussion, a 64-bit prefix is allocated to the
server which is used for routing, and a 64-bit IID is used to carry the encrypted
information.
However, our model does not require the prefix length to be 64-bit. Assigning a
shorter prefix such as /56 is also feasible. The prefix space is used for routing, so in
some cases, the server has to be allocated a longer prefix. For example, the server is
built in a /64 subnet, and there are more than one devices in the subnet. In this case, a
/68 or /72 prefix can be assigned.
A longer prefix means a shorter suffix, thus less space to carry the encryption
information. The suffix length cannot be too short, otherwise, security will be
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jeopardized. As an extreme example, if the prefix is /120 and the suffix is only 8-bit
long, then an attacker can trivially traverse the entire range space of the ciphertext and
hit a legal address with only 256 trials. And some encryption algorithms need to be
modified to shorten the length of the ciphertext when the suffix is shorter than 64-bit.
Further, the prefix length is a flexibly adjustable configuration in our model, because
it is only known by the entrance module and the main service module. It is easy to
cooperatively adjust the prefix length by the service operator when the network
configuration changes.
Load Balancing and High Availability
In the above discussion, there is only one entrance module and one main service module
by default. In fact, our model supports multiple main service modules and/or multiple
entrance modules without any modification.
Multiple main service modules can be deployed smoothly and transparently. For
example, in Fig 7, four main service modules are deployed to jointly serve the /64
address space. In this case, the entire server cluster shares a /64 prefix, but the prefix of
each device may have any length longer than /64, and each can be of different lengths.
The only requirement is that the prefixes of all the devices should cover the entire /64
address space, otherwise routing will fail and some packets will not be responded. Note
that overlap is allowed, since the current routing rule of longest prefix matching will
ensure proper routing. The existence of multiple devices, the number of the devices, and
the respective prefix length of each device are all imperceptible to the outside world,
and cannot be obtained by any measurement approaches. This invisibility obviously
helps to protect server security.
Main Service Module 1
2001:da8::/66
IPv6 Client
Entrance Module
Main Service Module 2
2001:da8:0:0:4000::/66
Main Service Module 3
2001:da8:0:0:8000::/66
Main Service Module 4
2001:da8:0:0:c000::/66
First Hop Router
2001:da8::/64
Internet
Fig 7. Multiple Main Service Modules and Random Load Balancing. In this
example, four main service modules jointly serve the /64 prefix of the server. Because
the generated address is uniformly distributed and random enough, the load is evenly
distributed among them automatically.
Similarly, multiple entrance modules can also be distributed in different territories
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and different ISP networks to optimize performance. Because the entrance module only
provides the function of address generation which is very simple and stateless, it is even
easier to be arbitrarily stacked in parallel. These entrance modules carry the same key
and the same logic, therefore they generate the same address for the same client at the
same time.
This support for multiple main service modules and/or multiple entrance modules
goes beyond capacity expansion. Further, it provides a new and flexible framework to
achieve load balancing and high availability related features.
Random Load Balancing. Our model achieve random load balancing
automatically without any further modification or configuration. Because the addresses
generated by the algorithm in the entrance module are uniformly distributed and
random enough, the load is evenly distributed among the suffix space. If the devices all
have the same prefix length, then the load is evenly distributed among them. For
example in Fig 7, each device has a /66 prefix, so the load will be evenly distributed
among these four devices. If the devices have different prefix lengths, then the load is
distributed among the devices proportional to the size of the suffix space that is served
by each of them. For example in Fig 7, if we delegate 2001:da8::/67,
2001:da8:0:0:2000::/67, 2001:da8:0:0:4000::/66, and 2001:da8:0:0:8000::/65 to the 4
devices respectively, then each will share 1/8, 1/8, 1/4, and 1/2 of the load respectively.
The advantages of the random load balancing feature in our model include:
1. Simplicity. Random load balancing in our model is completely stateless and
requires no scheduling. The devices of the main service module can be arbitrarily
stacked, and the load will be automatically distributed among them. To distribute
the load in proportion to device capacity is easy. Operators only need to delegate
different prefix lengths to the devices and configure routes accordingly.
2. Security. Our address generation algorithm is random. The configuration of
devices of the main service module is completely imperceptible and transparent to
the outside world. Thus attacks against load balancing become ineffective.
However random load balancing has the limitation of lack of control. The load is
distributed completely random, thus cannot be controlled according to the status of the
devices. Precisely, it is the number of requests instead of the load itself that is
distributed, and it is statistically even instead of strictly even at any time. Resources
consumed by different connections may vary greatly, and random allocation may not be
absolutely uniform. While some devices are temporarily overloaded, others can be idle,
resulting in a waste of resources and possible service failure on some devices.
Dynamic Load Balancing. To overcome the above limitation of random load
balancing, our model supports dynamic load balancing through two schemes: routing
configuration and entrance module strategy.
One way to achieve dynamic load balancing is based on routing, and all the devices
of the main service module share one /64 prefix. The delegation of sub-prefixes to each
device under this prefix and the related routes can be dynamically configured. In this
way, the load of different devices can be adjusted in real-time to balance the utilization
of each device. Caution that during the adjustment the sub-prefixes of all the devices
should always cover the entire /64 address space.
High availability cluster can be naturally achieved in this scheme, such as
active-active cluster and hot standby. When a device is detected to be failing, it can go
offline simply by immediately redistributing its related prefixes and routes to other
devices, so that the service will not be affected. A self-illustrated example is given in
Fig 8.
Another way to achieve dynamic load balancing is based on the entrance module
strategy, and each of the devices of the main service module is delegated one /64 prefix
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Main Service Module 1
2001:da8::/66
change to 2001:da8::/65
IPv6 Client
Entrance Module
Main Service Module 2
2001:da8::4000::/66
remove related routes
Main Service Module 3
2001:da8::8000::/66
Main Service Module 4
2001:da8::c000::/66
First Hop Router
2001:da8::/64
Internet
Overloaded!
Fig 8. Active-Active High Availability Cluster in Dynamic Load Balancing
based on Routing. When a device fails, it can go offline by simply redistributing its
related prefixes and routes to other devices.
instead of sharing one /64 prefix. This means the entire server needs a shorter prefix.
Nevertheless, for a server that needs dynamic load balancing, a /48 or even shorter
prefix is not a problem [64]. In this case, the entrance module needs to add extra
function when generating destination addresses. The 64-bit suffix is still generated as
described above, but the 64-bit prefix is no longer the fixed server prefix. Instead, the
prefix is selected among the prefixes of the cluster devices using load balancing
algorithms, such as round-robin algorithm, least connections algorithm, etc.
An example is given in Fig 9. The main service module is composed of 4 devices.
Each is configured with an /64 prefix, which is 2001:da8::/64, 2001:da8:0:1::/64,
2001:da8:0:2::/64, and 2001:da8:0:3::/64 respectively. Thus the prefix of the entire server
is 2001:da8::/62. The load balancer resides in the entrance module, and it selects among
these 4 prefixes according to real-time load using a load balancing algorithm. The
entrance module generates the suffix using the encryption algorithm f(SA) described in
previous sections, then combine it with the selected prefix to generate the destination
address.
In this case, the devices of the main service module do not need to be connected to
the same first-hop router, and can be distributed deployed (Note the difference between
Fig 9 and Fig 8). Similar to CDN that is based on DNS redirection, the main service
modules can be distributed all over the world, and the entrance module is responsible
for server selection. The optimal main service module can be selected in a fully
controllable manner using information such as geographic location, network capacity,
and the ISP of the client.
All in all, our model provides a new and flexible framework that naturally supports
various load balancing, high availability, and CDN features. For specific network
scenarios like data center network, the network topology, structure, and routing
configuration can be further optimized. This framework provides great potential for
future work.
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Main Service Module 1
2001:da8::/64
IPv6 Client
Main Service Module 2
2001:da8:0:1::/64
Main Service Module 3
2001:da8:0:2::/64
Main Service Module 4
2001:da8:0:3::/64
Select Prefix 
according to Load 
2001:da8::/64
2001:da8:0:1::/64
2001:da8:0:2::/64
2001:da8:0:3::/64
Internet
Entrance Module
Load Balancer
Generate Suffix 
using Encryption 
Algorithm f(SA)
Fig 9. Dynamic Load Balancing based on Entrance Module Strategy. The
load balancer resides on entrance module and selects among the prefixes of multiple
main service modules according to load.
Security Analysis
The primary goal of our model is to prevent the server from being scanned. Therefore,
we first discuss its anti-scanning feature, then other security features. Finally, we
analyze the big data characteristics of the addresses generated in our model and its
ability to resist big data analysis.
Network Scanning
As introduced in the Related Work Section, recent advances of IPv6 scanning can be
divided into two types:
1. Scan by collecting active IPv6 address records.
2. Scan by generating a hitlist using pattern recognition algorithms.
Scanning by collecting active address records does not pose a threat to our model.
The main service module is imperceptible to outside. If one of the addresses of the main
service module is collected, as soon as the flow terminates, the address will no longer be
active. This makes the collected address records completely useless.
Scanning by generating hitlists using pattern recognition algorithms does not pose a
threat to our model either. According to the discussion in Subsection Big Data
Analysis, the addresses generated by our algorithm do not have any pattern. This
makes scanning through the generated hitlists no different from brute force scanning.
Another way to scan is to collect active addresses inside the subnet. However, as
described in previous sections, the main service module does not use any global unicast
address in the subnet. Attackers cannot get any useful addresses from the subnet.
Therefore, this approach cannot pose a threat to our model as well.
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As a result, for our model the above techniques are no different from brute force
scanning, which is generally unworkable in IPv6.
However, things are complicated by our salting algorithm, which allows more than
one destination addresses to pass the verification corresponding to the same source
address at the same time. For example, if the step size X in Eq (11) is 5 milliseconds,
and the threshold in Eq (16) is 10 seconds, then 2000 legitimate addresses can pass the
verification at the same time. Assuming that the suffix length of the main service
module is N , there are P legal timestamps within the threshold, then the probability
that a random address can pass the verification is enlarged from 1
2N
to P
2N
. Fig 10
shows an illustration, where all addresses from Address 1 to Address 4 can pass the
verification.
Fig 10. More Than One Legitimate Destination Addresses Can Pass
Verification. This is due to the threshold introduced in Eq (16).
With the same scanning efficiency of Zmap under IPv4, which takes 45 minutes to
scan the 232 address space, the expected time T of the scanning will be
T =
3 ∗ 2N−32
4P
(20)
To protect the server from being scanned, T should be long enough, for example,
longer than 1 year. Then P and N should satisfy Eq (21)
N − log2P ≥ 46 (21)
Eq (21) is easy to satisfy. For example, if a threshold of 10 seconds and a step size of
1ms are used, the expected scanning time T is about 9 years, which is too long to be
worried about. Therefore, the complexity introduced by the salting algorithm does not
harm the anti-scanning feature of our model.
Our above discussion focus on preventing the main service module from being
scanned. Note that the entrance module is inevitably exposed to scanning, because
some sort of entry address must be configured into the DNS system. However, first,
scanning the entrance module does not pose a threat to the main server, because the
address that provides the main service has been separated from the entrance module.
Second, unnecessary exposure is eliminated through this separation, and the main
service module, as the main body of the server, is well protected. Third, the entrance
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module is somehow similar to a bastion host. It provides no business logic, and the
consequences of it being scanned are much more limited. Thus risks are isolated and
controlled to a smaller scope.
DoS Attack
DoS attack is one of the major threats faced by high-profile public servers. We discuss
two typical types of DoS attack here: TCP Syn-Flood and UDP Flood.
Syn-Flood does not pose a threat to our model. All messages received by the main
server are verified, and the ones with inappropriate source address-destination address
pairs will be discarded. This means that the server does not need to send SYN+ACK
messages, nor allocate CPU time or memory to maintain a queue waiting for subsequent
packets.
Similarly, for UDP Floods, all the illegal UDP packets will be dropped immediately,
and no resources will be allocated. Therefore, neither Syn-Flood nor UDP Flood poses
a threat to our model.
Admittedly, the mitigation of DoS attacks is also limited. Our model cannot prevent
the types of attacks that do not target the server directly, such as bandwidth attacks.
Nor can it prevent attacks in which each of the malicious requests first gets a legitimate
address from the entrance module. In this case, an intrusion detection system can be
deployed on the entrance module to detect and respond to abnormal traffic.
Again, the entrance module is still exposed to DoS attacks. However, the entrance
provides limited service with little traffic load, so its ability to withstand DoS attacks is
much higher. And its function is very simple, so it is easy to be duplicated, stacked, and
distributed deployed, which further enhances its resistance to DoS attacks.
Application Vulnerability Attack
To prevent application vulnerability attacks generally requires software and hardware
updates in time. However, our model can mitigate this threat by applying stricter
authentication in the entrance module. The entrance module can be configured with
authentication or admission strategies, so that only an authorized user can get the
legitimate address, and the other requests are discarded. In this way, adversaries cannot
even obtain the address of the main service module, let alone exploiting application or
operating system vulnerabilities to launch attacks such as SQL injection attacks.
Replay Attack and Session Hijack
A salting algorithm is introduced in our model to prevent replay attacks. The
destination address generated by the entrance module is different each time. If an
attacker launches replay attacks using previously intercepted packets, the address will
already become illegal.
However, there is a complication introduced by the threshold in Eq (16). Though
the entrance module dutifully generates a different address each time, a given address
can pass the verification of the main service module in a time window of length
threshold. Thus if an attacker intercepts a packet and launches replay attacks fast
enough within threshold, the address will remain valid and pass the verification.
It can be solved by requiring the main service module to cache the addresses used in
connections that have just ended within a time window of length threshold, and to
reject connection requests with destination addresses that have been used recently.
However, this caching is memory intensive for a high-traffic server. New vulnerabilities
like cache exhaustion attack can be introduced, though the attacker needs to contact
the entrance module first to get a huge amount of legitimate addresses. This strategy,
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accompanied by an intrusion detection system deployed on the entry module, can be an
option for servers with high security requirements but not too much traffic.
Similar to fast replay attacks, the attacker can monitor the connection and launch
session hijacking attacks. This is because verification is conducted only once for each
flow in our model for performance considerations. Once the connection is established,
the client and the main service module communicate directly without verification, which
can be taken advantage of.
These two kinds of attacks can both be prevented using encryption at higher layers.
Considering that our model is a network layer model, it is orthogonal thus compatible
with encryption protocols at the transport or application layer, such as TLS [34],
DTLS [65], and HTTPs [66]. These protocols can encrypt the packet payload and
invalidate replay attacks and session hijacking attacks.
Key Cracking
For breaking symmetric encryption, the plaintext-ciphertext pair needs to be obtained
to guess the key. Even if an attacker intercepts the messages, the plaintext of the
function e() in Eq (6) is confidential and cannot be inferred from the source address.
This is because the salting algorithm in our model makes the plaintext time-varying.
The precise timestamp is difficult to get, let alone the parameters T0 and X are
confidential. As a result, although DES is considered insecure in the modern Internet, it
has a sufficient security level in our model.
ND related Attack
ND attacks are unique in IPv6 because the ND protocol [67] is designed to replace the
ARP [68] protocol of IPv4. There are many kinds of ND related attacks, which can be
roughly divided into DAD attacks [69,70], spoofing attacks (such as RA spoofing,
malicious redirection), and cache exhaustion attacks.
Our model allocates a prefix to the main service module instead of an address, and
there is only one device under this prefix. A lot of ND packets used for neighbor
communication are no longer needed. Thus related threats are eliminated, including
rouge NA and NS messages and DAD DoS Attacks [71].
On the other hand, ND messages are still used in the prefix allocating process by
some mechanisms such as DHCP-PD. Thus RA spoofing attacks still pose a threat.
And link-local addresses are used to communicate with the first-hop router in the
subnet in our model, so ND attacks on the link-local addresses are still effective.
Meanwhile, the entrance module still has a fixed address that can be attacked.
Therefore, although our model protects the main service module from a lot of ND
attacks, it is recommended to deploy ND-related security policies such as SEND [33,72],
RA-guard [73,74].
Big Data Analysis
In our model, one concern is that the attacker obtains a lot of source
addresses-destination addresses pairs by intercepting a large number of network traffic
data, and learns patterns of the generated addresses to launch attacks and scans.
However, if the generated addresses have sufficiently good statistical characteristics,
that is, random and evenly distributed enough, attackers cannot crack, scan, or attack
by big data analysis.
We use simulations to demonstrate that the destination addresses generated using
our algorithm have good statistical characteristics. In the simulation, we generate a
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large number of destination address suffixes then analyze them. Our simulation is
conducted in 2 groups, and the results are shown in Fig 11.
Fig 11. Distribution of the Generated Suffixes. (a) is the result of Group 1,
where 1000 destination addresses are generated using one fixed source address at
different times. (b) is the result of Group 2, where 1000 destination addresses (blue
points) are generated using 1000 source addresses (red points) collected in real-world
campus network traffic. The generated suffixes are evenly distributed in both groups.
The figure is plotted in the following manner. Since our algorithm generates address
suffixes, we show the scatter plot of the generated suffixes. The longitudinal coordinate
of each point is determined by the 65-96 bits of the address. For example, if the 65-96
bits are 0000:0000, then the vertical coordinate is 0; and if the 65-96 bits are
FFFF:FFFF, then the vertical coordinate is 1. Similarly, the horizontal coordinate of a
point is determined by the 97-128 bits of the address in the same way.
In Group 1, we use a fixed address as the source address, and generate 1000
destination address suffixes using it. The salt used in the process naturally varies over
time, so the generated addresses are different. The distribution of the generated suffixes
is shown in Fig 11(a). It shows that suffixes generated using the same source address
over time are sufficiently evenly distributed and have no obvious pattern.
In Group 2, we collect 1000 active addresses in real-world network traffic from
Tsinghua Campus Network. Then we use these 1000 source addresses to generate 1000
destination address suffixes. The results are shown in Fig 11(b). The red points are the
suffixes of the source addresses, while the blue points are the suffixes of the generated
addresses. An interesting observation is that the collected IPv6 addresses have an
obvious pattern. A huge number of addresses set all of the 65-96 bits to zero, while
another huge number of addresses set all of the 97-128 bits to zero. Nevertheless, the
suffixes generated by our algorithm using these collected addresses are still evenly
distributed.
Furthermore, to evaluate the randomness of the generated addresses, we calculated
the entropy of them. This approach is often used to evaluate the randomness of IP
addresses [11–14]. The entropy is calculated for each nybble (a nybble is 4-bit), so there
are 16 entropy values in total for a 64-bit suffix. In probability theory, for a discrete
random variable X with possible values {x1, ..., xk} and probability mass function
P (X), entropy is defined as
H(X) = −
k∑
i=1
P (xi)logP (xi) (22)
For each nybble in our case, there are 16 possible hex characters. From probability
theory we know that H(X) is maximum if P (X) is uniform, so here the maximum
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entropy is log16. For the k-th nybble, if character ci occurs Ni times (assume there are
N samples totally), the entropy normalized using the maximum entropy is
ek = −1
4
16∑
i=1
Ni
N
log(
Ni
N
) (23)
The results are shown in Fig 12. Fig 12(a) shows the results of Group 1, and
Fig 12(b) shows the results of Group 2. The red line is the entropy of the source address
suffixes, while the blue line is the entropy of the generated destination address suffixes.
It is interesting yet reasonable that the collected addresses are not so random, especially
for higher nybbles. In both groups, the entropy of the generated suffixes for each nybble
is almost 1. Since the entropy is normalized using the maximum entropy, this means
that no matter the source addresses are random or not, the generated address suffixes
are sufficiently random in all bits.
Fig 12. Entropy of the Generated Suffixes. (a) is the result of Group 1, where
1000 destination addresses are generated using one fixed source address at different
times. (b) is the result of Group 2, where 1000 destination addresses are generated
using 1000 source addresses collected in real-world campus network traffic. Blue line
shows the entropy of the suffixes of the generated destination addresses, while red line
shows the entropy of the suffixes of the source addresses. In both groups, the entropy of
the generated suffixes is almost 1, which is the max entropy. The generated address
suffixes are sufficiently random in all bits.
In short, our model can withstand big data analysis attacks launched by obtaining
and analyzing large volumes of traffic data.
Prototype Implementation and Experiments
In this section, we introduce our prototype implementation and experiments based on
the prototype.
Prototype Implementation
Our prototype is implemented based on Linux, specifically, Raspbian OS based on
Debian. We make modifications to the NetFilter Linux kernel module to implement the
mechanism. In our prototype, the following features are implemented:
1. The server is divided into two modules. The entrance module is configured with
an IPv6 address while the main service module is assigned a prefix using
DHCP-PD. The main service module listens on all the addresses under the prefix.
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2. The entrance module and the main service module save the same key. When the
entrance module receives a request, it generates an address under the main service
module prefix and redirects the request to that address. When the main service
module receives a request, it conducts verification on the flow.
3. The encryption and the verification use DES as e() in Eq (6), and the salt is
added as Eq (11) to prevent replay attacks.
The algorithm implemented in the prototype is described as follows. The encryption
algorithm executed in the entrance module is Algorithm 1, while the verification
algorithm executed in the main service module is Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Encryption Algorithm Executed by the Entrance module
Input: SourceAddress,Key,Prefix,T0,X
Output: DestinationAddress
1: H SA = DJB(SourceAddress)
2: T current = time.currenttime()
3: Salt = (T current - T0) / X
4: P SA = XOR(Salt, H SA)
5: Suffix = DES(P SA,Key)
6: DestinationAddress = strcat(Prefix, Suffix)
7: return DestinationAddress
Algorithm 2 Verification Algorithm Executed by the Main Service module
Input: SourceAddress,DestinationAddress,Key,T0,X,T threshold
Output: True/False
1: H SA = DJB(SourceAddress)
2: Suffix = DestinationAddress[64:128]
3: P SA = DES−1(Suffix, Key)
4: T current = time.currenttime()
5: Salt = XOR(H SA, P SA)
6: T send = Salt*X + T0
7: T delta = T current - T send
8: if T delta ¡ T threshold and T delta ¿ 0 then
9: return True
10: end if
11: return False
Experiment Environment
Our experiment is built on a /48 subnet in CERNET (China Education and Research
Network). The entrance module and the main service module are configured in the
same subnet. We use DHCP-PD to allocate a prefix to the main service module while
the addresses of the client and the entrance module are configured manually. We use
Kea for the DHCP server.
We use Raspberry Pis for all the devices in the experiment, and the operating system
of each Pi is Raspbian, which comes with the Raspberry Pi and is based on Debian.
The experiment topology is described in Fig 13.
Five devices are configured in the experiment subnet. One is a legal client, one is a
scanner, one is the entrance module of the server, and one is the main service module.
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Fig 13. Topology of the Experiment Subnet.
To offer a baseline for the experiment, we configure the last one a traditional server as
the control group.
Experiment on Defense of Scanning
In the experiment, the server is configured as a public HTTP web server based on the
apache and Django framework. The demo web page displays the source address and
destination address of the visit for the demonstration. We use a client to access the
server through the entrance module first, and the result shows that the client can visit
the main server smoothly, while the client cannot get any response if it tries to visit the
main server directly. This shows that the main server cannot be perceived by the
outside world directly.
To test the scanning defense feature of the main server, a client is used as the
attacker. Three types of scans are tested in the experiment. First, we perform a
100-hour brute-force scan on the main service module. The result shows that the scan
does not hit any address.
Then, we generate 1 million addresses under the /64 prefix using Entropy/IP and
6gen, and use them as the hitlists to scan the server. The scan does not hit any address
as well.
Finally, ND information for other devices in the subnet is collected to compose a
hitlist to conduct the scan. Similarly, no address can be accessed as well. Therefore, our
model can prevent the main service module from being scanned by existing IPv6
scanning approaches.
Experiment on Performance
We conduct two sets of experiments on performance in this subsection. First on the
delay in the connection establishment phase, then on the RTT, bandwidth, and jitter
after the connection is established.
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Because our model introduces additional overhead only in the connection
establishment phase which influences the delay most, we first conduct experiments on
the delay in the connection establishment phase. We use Wireshark to monitor the
delay. Compared with the control group, the extra delay introduced by our model
equals the time elapses between the entrance module receiving the first packet and the
main server module receiving the first packet. This value can be described by Eq (24).
Tadd = Ttrans en + Ttrans ma + Tprocess cl + Tencryption en + Tverification ma (24)
In Eq (24), Ttrans en is the transmission delay from the entrance module to the
client; Ttrans ma is the transmission delay from the client to the main service module;
Tprocess cl is the processing time from the client receiving the redirect message to the
client sending the new request to the main server; Tencryption en is the processing time
from the entrance module receiving the request to it sending the redirect message; while
Tverification ma is the processing time from the main service module receiving the
request to it completing the verification. We test these five items separately to analyze
to which degree each of them influences the delay.
First, Ttrans en and Ttrans ma typically vary from several to hundreds of milliseconds.
The one-way transmission delay measured in our experiment environment is very small
(several milliseconds), but this value is greatly affected by the specific network
environment of each client, so our results are not representative and we will not display
it here. However, considering that the additional cost caused by two one-way delays is
usually a small number (generally at most a few hundred milliseconds) comparing with
the total access time cost, it may not cause a user-perceivable impact.
Second, we test the effect of Tprocess cl. Tprocess cl is dependent on the hardware and
the application of the client. We conducted the experiments in three groups of client
settings: Group (a) uses Linux and Wget, Group (b) uses Windows and IE 11 Browser,
and Group (c) uses Windows and Chrome Browser. Each client launches access to our
prototype website and Tprocess cl is measured in each test using tcpdump/Wireshark.
Each group launches access to our prototype website for five times, with an hour
interval between each. The result is shown in Fig 14.
Fig 14. Tprocess cl with Different OSes and Browsers. We measure the process
time of the client from receiving the redirect message to it sending the new request to
the main server. It is greatly affected by the environment, but will not exceeds 10
milliseconds.
From Fig 14, we can see that Tprocess cl is greatly affected by different hardware and
software environment, but it is less than 10 milliseconds in all groups. It means that
Tprocess cl brings little additional delay and does not influence user experience at all.
Finally, Tencryption en and Tverification ma represent the execution time of the
encryption and verification process, respectively. We conduct experiments on the
September 29, 2020 26/33
encryption and verification time cost. The experiment is repeated 10 times. The result
is shown in Fig 15.
Fig 15. Encryption Time and Verification Time. The time cost is less than 0.05
milliseconds, and its influence to server performance is negligible.
From Fig 15, we can see that the execution time of a single encryption or verification
operation does not exceed 0.05 milliseconds, which is negligible to the delay and will not
affect the server performance.
In summary, the additional delay brought by our model is determined by the two
one-way transmission delay, while the sum of the other time overhead will not exceed
several milliseconds. The total additional delay is acceptable and will not affect user
experience.
In order to test the impact of our model on network performance after the connection
is established, we conduct experiments on the RTT, bandwidth, and jitter between the
client and the server. The result is shown in Fig 16. Our model does not bring any
additional cost in RTT, bandwidth, or jitter once the connection is established.
Fig 16. RTT, Bandwidth, and Jitter Between Client and Server after
Connection Establishment. There is no performance difference between our model
and a traditional server. Our model brings no additional cost once the connection is
established.
Discussion
Compatibility, Deployability, and Evolvability
Our model has good compatibility with the current Internet. A client agnostic of our
model can visit the server smoothly. And none of the other participants of the Internet
need any modification, such as ISP or DNS servers. Moreover, the modification is
limited within the network layer, thus the model transparently supports protocols of the
transportation layer and application layer. All in all, our model requires no transition
mechanism, is simple, and can be easily deployed.
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Not only can our model provide a new perspective on many security and functional
issues including the scanning problem, but also it provides a new and flexible framework
for public servers. Various strategies can be formulated based on this framework, such
as user authentication on the entrance module, distributed deployment, and load
balancing and high availability of the server cluster, etc. We believe that various
exciting models can be proposed based on this framework. Therefore, our model has
good scalability and potential.
Consideration on IPv6 Address Space
Is it too extravagant that we assign an entire prefix to one server in our model?
Although the number of prefixes that can be allocated is much fewer than the number
of addresses in the IPv6 address space, the worry that the IPv6 addresses will be
exhausted is unnecessary. All addresses under 2000::/3 are global unicast addresses.
There are 8.6 billion global unicast /36 prefixes in total, which means that everyone in
the world can be allocated a /36 prefix, not to mention that there are 268 million /64
prefixes under a single /36 prefix. Even if a server is allocated a /56 prefix or even a /48
prefix, the current IPv6 address space is still enough. Therefore, assigning a prefix to
each server will not exhaust the IPv6 address space.
Consideration on IPv4
Is our model available for IPv4? Theoretically, yes. In IPv4, the server can also be
divided into an entrance module and a main service module, the main service module
can also be configured with a block of addresses while the entrance module can also
generate a verifiable address using encryption algorithm and provide redirection.
However, there are two problems in IPv4:
1. In IPv6, we use a 64-bit suffix length to carry the ciphertext. However, in IPv4,
the entire address space is only 32-bit. It cannot provide sufficient security level in
encryption, resulting in the encryption being easily cracked.
2. Different from the high redundancy of IPv6 address space, IPv4 addresses are very
scarce. In IPv4, to allocate a block of addresses to one server is wasteful and
literally too expensive6. Therefore, it is unrealistic.
Therefore, our model is only recommended to be used in IPv6.
Conclusion
In this paper, a novel Internet server model named addressless server is introduced.
This model separates the entrance module from the main service module, and uses
prefix delegation mechanism to allocate an IPv6 prefix instead of an IPv6 address to the
main service module. When a user sends a request to the server, the entrance module
generates an address under the main service module prefix by encrypting the user
address, then redirects the request to the generated address. A time-varying salt is
added in the encryption process to make the address different in each connection. The
main service module verifies each request received and drops all packets that failed
verification. In this way, our model can prevent the main server from being scanned and
other security threats such as DoS attacks and replay attacks.
Our model takes advantage of the massive IPv6 address space to hide the address in
use, and incorporates encryption into IPv6 addresses, which can fully utilize the
6https://ipv4marketgroup.com/ipv4-pricing/
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redundant space of IPv6 address. By allocating a prefix to the main service module, our
model eliminates the one-to-one correspondence between the server and the IP address.
Our model not only shields the server from scanning, but also establishes a new network
framework for servers that supports desirable features such as load balancing,
active-active cluster, and CDN conveniently.
We implement a prototype of the addressless server and conduct simulations and
experiments based on it. The results show that users can access the server smoothly
while scan traffic cannot get any response. The addresses generated by the algorithm
are sufficiently random and uniformly distributed, which prevents attackers from using
big data analysis to scan the servers or crack the keys. Our experiments on the
performance show that only during the establishment of the connection does it bring
additional delay, and it does not affect user experience. Once the connection is
established, our model will not affect delay, bandwidth, or jitter.
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